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Gainsharing and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
Nicole Mattingano-Reinhart* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Gainsharing is a business practice that can reduce costs and increase efficiency while engaging 
and rewarding front-line workers.1 Although the practice reportedly began as early as the nineteenth 
century,2 it became popular in the 1930s in the steel manufacturing industry.3 While several different 
forms of performance incentives fall under the category of "gainsharing," in the typical gainsharing 
arrangement, employees are invited to suggest cost-saving improvements to processes and the 
selection of materials.4 They are then compensated with a previously agreed upon portion of the 
savings associated with the improvements.5 
There have been attempts to introduce gainsharing programs in healthcare settings in order to 
help reduce the increasing costs of healthcare.6 Unfortunately, gainsharing programs are likely to 
violate several federal statutes including tax regulations/ the federal Anti-Kickback Statute,8 the Stark 
Law,9 and the Civil Monetary Penalties Statute (CMP Statute).1° Consequently, gainsharing has been 
·J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, 2005, New York University. 
1 V . Michel Magliore Marcoux, Why Healthcare Fraud and Abuse Laws Should Allow Appropriate Hospital Gainsharing, 
59 ALA. L. REV. 539, 542 (2008). 
2 Theresa M. Welboume & Luis R. Gomez Mejia, Gainsharing: A Critical Review and a Future Research Agenda 3 (Ctr. 
for Advanced Human Res. Studies, Working Paper No. 95-10, 1995), available at 
http:/ I digi talcornmons. ilr. cornell.edu/ cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article= 1199 &contex t=cahrswp&sei-
redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D4%26sqi%3D2% 
26ved%3DOCDQQFjAD%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fdigitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewconten 
t.cgi%253Farticle%253Dl199%2526context%253Dcahrswp%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Dhistory%2520of%2520gainsharing%2 
6ei%3DNhqeTruSFsWw8QPEqNGKCQ%26usg%3DAFQjCNEykAMn _ 1_ ZyRYt84sMNN308 _mTNw%26sig2%3D3jX 
baBiq6Muypog 1 GOmv 1 A#search=%22history%,20gainsharing%22. 
3 Richard S. Saver, Squandering the Gain: Gainsharing and the Continuing Dilemma of Physician Financial Incentives, 98 
Nw. U. L. REv. 145, 148 (2003). 
4 Marcoux, supra note 1, at 542. 
5 ld. 
6 See, e.g., Deficit Reduction Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-71 , § 5007(c)(l), 120 Stat. 4 (2006); Medicare Modernization 
Act, Pub. L. No. 108- 173, § 646, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
7 Treas. Reg.§ 1.50l(c)(3)- l(c)(2). 
8 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2006). 
9 ld. § 1395nn(a)(l ). 
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limited to a few Medicare demonstration programs. The statutes that provide for these demonstration 
programs allow for waivers or exemptions of the Anti-Kickback Statute, Stark Law, and CMP Statute 
for hospitals participating in the demonstration programs. 11 
On March 23, 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA) for the purpose of expanding health insurance coverage and reducing the cost of 
healthcare. 12 Because gainsharing is one potential method of reducing costs while maintaining or 
improving performance, this Comment will analyze whether the PP ACA adequately removes the legal 
barriers associated with gainsharing. 
Part II of this Comment will discuss the history of gainsharing practices in general as well as 
attempts to institute gainsharing in healthcare settings. It will also identify the potential risks 
associated with gainsharing programs, which must be taken into account when enacting statutory safe 
harbors or amending the applicable laws. Part III will discuss the statutory barriers to establishing 
gainsharing programs in hospitals and efforts to remedy those barriers prior to the enactment of the 
PP ACA. Part IV of this Comment will discuss provisions in the PP ACA that may help resolve the 
legal problems associated with gainsharing. It will then analyze the likelihood that these provisions 
will encourage successful gainsharing programs. Part IV will also argue that the solutions adopted in 
the PP ACA are not sufficient to overcome the legal hurdles that currently prevent the institution of 
gainsharing programs. Part V of this Comment will recommend amendments to the law that will 
better address these issues. 13 The recommended amendments include statutory safe harbors for 
10 Jd. § 1320a-7a. 
11 See, e.g., Deficit Reduction Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-71, § 5007(c)(l), 120 Stat. 4 (2006); Medicare Modernization 
Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 646, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
12 See, e.g., The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2718 (20 1 0) (entitled "Bringing down 
the cost of health care coverage"); The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2702 (2010) 
(entitled "Guaranteed availability of coverage"). 
13 Provisions of the PP ACA have been challenged, particularly the provision that all individuals obtain health insurance 
(the "individual mandate"). See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) ajj'd,. No. 10-
2388, 2011 WL 2556039 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011); Florida ex rei. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 648 
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gainsharing programs that meet particular criteria, which will enable the health care system to enjoy 
the benefits of gainsharing while the law protects against potential drawbacks. Part VI concludes. 
II. GAINSHARING: HISTORY AND BARRIERS TO ITS APPLICATION IN THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY 
A. History of Gainsharing and Its Introduction into the Healthcare Setting 
Gainsharing was first applied mainly in the context of manufacturing. 14 One of the first 
gainsharing programs is attributed to Joseph Scanlon, who established a gainsharing program "to save 
a failing company," in the 1930s.15 This gainsharing model, now known as the "Scanlon Plan," is 
very similar to that described supra in Section I. Employees were asked to provide suggestions on 
how to improve productivity. 16 A group of higher-level employees formed the "screening committee" 
that determined which suggestions to implement and evaluated their effectiveness after 
implementation. 17 In addition to simply reducing costs, the success of the plan has been attributed to 
"employee involvement, bonus payment, and identity with the firm." 18 The program enabled workers 
to provide insights on the production process and thus encouraged collaboration and teamwork. 19 
Because gainsharing ties rewards to processes and circumstances directly under the workers' control-
in contrast to profit sharing in which the reward may be tied to external circumstances-some have 
argued that gainsharing programs increase employee loyalty.20 Additionally, front-line workers have 
F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) . Although the constitutionality of the provisions related to gainsharing have not been called 
into question, it is possible that the statute will be overturned or will be repealed if the individual mandate is struck down. 
This is particularly true because the severability of the challenged provisions has been debated. The constitutionality of the 
PP ACA is beyond the scope of this Comment, but should the law be repealed or overturned, Congress should still adopt 
the provisions recommended in this Comment. 
14 Saver, supra note 3, at 186-87. 
15 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AFMD-81-22, PRODUCTIVITY SHARING PROGRAMS: CAN THEY CONTRffiUTE TO 
PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT? 7 (1981), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED224932.pdf. 
16 ld. at 8. 
17 Jd. 
18 Jd. 
19 Saver, supra note 3, at 188. 
20 Jd. 
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access to more information about day-to-day operations than managers, so they are likely to be able to 
provide novel insights on how to save money?1 
The success of gainsharing initiatives in industries other than healthcare has depended upon a 
number of factors. For example, companies that did not establish a culture of "worker participation" 
or that did not invest the necessary time and up-front costs have not been successful in establishing 
gainsharing programs.22 In a 1999 study, researchers examined the likelihood of survival of 211 
gainsharing programs. 23 Dong-One Kim, a professor of Industrial Relations and Human Resource 
Management, found that the programs most likely to survive were those that employees had approved 
with a vote, those that included re-training of employees and training of new employees, those with 
"small bonus groups" under 100 employees, those instituted in a "labor-intensive organization[]" and 
in a financially healthy organization, and those that involved a "major capital investment."24 There 
was also an indirect effect related to the positive performance of the program, such that, 
unsurprisingly, the programs that were most successful in saving costs and compensating employees 
l.k 1 . 25 were most 1 e y to survtve. 
Although healthcare may not be considered "labor-intensive," the other factors that Kim 
identified can apply to gainsharing programs in the healthcare industry. Those instituting gainsharing 
in a healthcare setting can encourage the program's success by having physicians vote on the program, 
ensuring proper training, and limiting the bonus groups to fewer than 100 physicians. Additionally, 
the financial health of the entity and the financial assets available should be considered. 
Healthcare providers can adopt practices from the manufacturing setting-such as 
gainsharing-to improve efficiency of healthcare delivery without sacrificing quality of care. 
21 ld. at 186-87. 
22 ld. at 199. 
23 Dong-One Kim, Determinants of the Survival ofGainsharing Programs, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 21,21 (1999). 
24 ld. at 34-36. 
25 Id. at 37. 
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Shouldice Hernia Hospital in Toronto, Canada is a well-known example of this principle. Shouldice 
applies strategies from manufacturing such as specialization through limiting their area of practice to 
only one medical condition, quality control through peer supervision, and standardization of surgical 
procedures.26 Shouldice's success and lowered costs are also attributable to the fact that Shouldice 
does not operate on high-risk patients, such as those who are overweight or have other medical 
conditions.27 But Shouldice's success illustrates that manufacturing principles are applicable to 
health care to reduce costs without compromising patient outcomes. 28 
Legal barriers have curtailed the establishment of gainsharing arrangements in the healthcare 
industry.29 In 1999, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), published an advisory bulletin stating that gainsharing arrangements were in 
direct violation of the federal CMP Statute. 30 The OIG noted that "it would take into consideration in 
exercising its enforcement discretion whether a gainsharing arrangement was terminated 
expeditiously," suggesting that active gainsharing arrangements should be shut down quickly in order 
to avoid penalties. 31 
26 Peter Behr, Rxfor the Economy?, THE WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 10, 1986, at El. 
27 Id. 
28 For example, a 2006 article reported that Shouldice's cost for disposable surgical items was less than $20 per surgery, 
compared to $200 to $800 per surgery at other hospitals. Sharda Prashad, A Cut Above the Rest, THE TORONTO STAR, Jan. 
22, 2006, at A19. The article also reported that Shouldice's complication and infection rate was under 0.5%. !d. 
29 Mary Ellen Schneider, Legal Concerns Hinder Adoption of Gainsharing, INTERNAL MEDICINE NEWS, May 1, 2007 at 50. 
30 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2006). The OIG Special Advisory Bulletin stated that: "While the OIG recognizes that 
appropriately structured gainsharing arrangements may offer significant benefits where there is no adverse impact on the 
quality of care received by patients, section 1128A(b)(1) of the [Social Security] Act [which sets forth the CMP law] 
clearly prohibits such arrangements. Moreover, regulatory relief from the CMP prohibition will require statutory 
authorization." OIG Special Advisory Bulletin, Gainsharing Arrangements and CMPs for Hospital Payments to Physicians 
to Reduce or Limit Services to Beneficiaries (July 1999), available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/gainsh.htm [hereinafter OIG Special Advisory Bulletin]; see also Thorton, 
Gainsharing: A Regulatory Breakthrough, but Challenges Remain, AHLA SEMINAR MATERIALS, P02090617 (2006). The 
CMP Statute prohibits hospitals from paying doctors for "reduc[ing] or limit[ing] services provided to Medicare and 
Medicaid patients and imposes civil penalties of up to $2000 per patient on both doctors and hospitals found to violate the 
law." 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a. 
31 Thorton, supra note 30. "In exercising its enforcement discretion, and in the absence of any evidence that a gainsharing 
arrangement has violated any other statutes or adversely affected patient care, the OIG will take into consideration whether 
a gainsharing arrangement was terminated expeditiously following publication of this Bulletin." OIG Special Advisory 
Bulletin, supra note 30. 
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In 2001, the outlook for gainsharing in healthcare became more favorable-the OIG provided 
an advisory opinion indicating that it would not impose penalties on a group of cardiologists who had 
established a gainsharing program in Atlanta.32 This created renewed optimism that gainsharing 
programs would be permitted in the future. 33 But the report from the OIG identified a number of 
specific factors that led to this decision.34 The factors included: identifying cost-saving initiatives at 
the outset of the project,35 which the OIC believed would promote "transparency;" establishing a plan 
for monitoring quality of patient care; setting thresholds for physician reimbursement; and disclosing 
to patients that the gainsharing program had been instituted.36 Some of these factors have since been 
used for guidance in establishing gainsharing demonstrations and proposing statutory exceptions to 
laws that would prevent gainsharing.37 Richard Saver, a leading scholar in the field of Health Law, 
however, has noted that many of the other factors that were important to the OIG in making its 
decision would be extremely difficult to replicate.38 For example, the doctors involved were all part of 
"the same legally organized medical group," and the cost-saving measures were already defined and 
supported in the literature. 39 
32 !d.; see Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01-01,2001 WL 36190940 (HHSOIG Jan. 11, 2001). 
33 Thorton, supra note 30. 
34 Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01-01, 2001 WL 36190940 (HHSOIG Jan. 11, 2001), supra note 32. 
35 The initiatives included nineteen measures for reducing costs, "fourteen recommendations that involve opening 
packaged items only as needed during a procedure." Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01-01, 2001 WL 36190940 
(HHSOIG Jan. 11, 2001). Four of the initiatives involved using less expensive products. !d. One initiative involved 
limiting the "use of Aprotinin-a medication currently given to many surgical patients pre-operatively to prevent 
hemorrhaging- to patients that are at higher risk of perioperative hemorrhage as indicated by objective clinical standards." 
!d. 
36 Saver, supra note 3, at 168. 
37 Medicare Gainsharing Demonstration: Report to Congress on Quality Improvement and Savings, CMS Report to 
Congress, available at https://www.cms.gov/reports/downloads/Buczko _Gain_ Sharing_ Final_ Report_ May_ 20 1l.pdf 
(Mar. 28, 2011); Wilson Hayman, Is Gainsharing Finally Here to Stay? Recent Advisory Opinions and Proposed Stark 
Exception Appear to Pave the Way, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Aug. 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/gainsharing-finally-here-to-stay-recent-advisory-opinions-and-propo. 
38 Saver, supra note 3, at 169-70. 
39 !d. at 170-71. 
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The federal government has sought to examine the feasibility and effectiveness of gainsharing 
programs through several demonstration programs.40 Section 646 of the Medicare Modernization Act 
(MMA), which was enacted in 2003, called for gainsharing demonstration programs in up to seventy-
two hospitals as part of the Physician-Hospital Collaboration Demonstration (PHCD).41 The MMA 
provided for a waiver of the CMP Statute for participating hospitals.42 Programs were instituted at 
Indiana Health Information Exchange (IHIE) and North Carolina Community Care Networks; 
however, they focused on pay-for-performance measures in general, rather than specifically on 
gainsharing.43 Gainsharing programs were to be established under the PHCD at eight hospitals that 
are part of the New Jersey Hospital Association.44 Although the hospitals received CMS approval to 
participate in the demonstration, they did not obtain OIG approval.45 Robert Wood Johnson 
University Hospital and St. Francis Medical Center, which were not participating in the program, sued 
40 Deficit Reduction Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-71, § 5007(c)(1), 120 Stat. 4 (2006), supra note 6; Medicare 
Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 646, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) supra note 6. 
41 Medicare Health Care Quality Demonstration Programs Fact Sheet, CMS.GOV, 
http://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/MMA646_FactSheet.pdf; Gainsharing Gets Boost,· Projects Still 
Lack Funding, MODERN PHYSICIAN.COM, available at 
http://www.modernphysician.com/article/20080609/MODERNPHYSICIAN/363294579 (June 9, 2008); Michael Romano, 
Gain-sharing Demo a Go; CMS Details Physician-hospital Collaboration Project, MODERN PHYSICIAN (Oct. 1, 2006) at 5, 
available at http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.shu.edulps/i.do?&id=GALE% 
7CA154247530&v=2.1&u=setonhallu&it=r&p=HRCA&sw=w. According to the MMA: 
[T]he Secretary shall establish a 5-year demonstration program under which the Secretary shall approve 
demonstration projects that examine health delivery factors that encourage the delivery of improved quality 
in patient care, including- ( 1) the provision of incentives to improve the safety of care provided to 
beneficiaries; (2) the appropriate use of best practice guidelines by providers and services by beneficiaries; 
(3) reduced scientific uncertainty in the delivery of care through the examination of variations in the 
utilization and allocation of services, and outcomes measurement and research; ( 4) encourage shared 
decision making between providers and patients; (5) the provision of incentives for improving the quality 
and safety of care and achieving the efficient allocation of resources; ( 6) the appropriate use of culturally 
and ethnically sensitive health care delivery; and (7) the financial effects on the health care marketplace of 
altering the incentives for care delivery and changing the allocation of resources. 
42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-3 (2006). 
42 !d. The MMA provides that "the Secretary may waive such requirements of titles XI and XVIII as may be necessary to 
carry out the purposes of the demonstration program established under this section." !d. § 1395cc-3. 
43 Medicare Health Care Quality Demonstration Programs Fact Sheet, supra note 41. 
44 Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Thompson, No. Civ.A.04-142(JWB), 2004 WL 3210732, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 
15, 2004). 
45 !d. at *11-12. 
8 
Department of HHS and CMS to enjoin the demonstration.46 The U.S. District Court for the District 
of New Jersey found that the demonstration project was a violation of the CMP Statute and, because 
the hospitals had not obtained OIG approval, granted the injunction.47 
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) created a demonstration program specifically for 
gainsharing initiatives, whic~ required CMS to establish gainsharing programs in up to six hospitals.48 
The Act provided a number of safe harbors for these pilot programs to ensure that they would not be in 
violation of sections 1128A, 1128B, and 1877 of the Social Security Act, which deal with physician 
inducement, remuneration, and financial relationships, respectively.49 In order to be chosen, 
applicants to the program were required to have an organized and specific implementation plan and a 
method to carefully measure quality of care and efficiency. 50 The demonstrations were also required 
46 !d. at *1. 
47 !d. at *13. 
48Deficit Reduction Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-71, § 5007(c)(1), 120 Stat. 4 (2006); DRA 5007 Medicare Hospital 
Gainsharing Demonstration Solicitation, CMS.GOV, https:/ /www.cms.gov/Medicare/Demonstration-
Projects/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads//DRA5007 _Solicitation. pdf. The DRA provided that: 
The Secretary shall establish under this section a qualified gainsharing demonstration program under which 
the Secretary shall approve demonstration projects by not later than November 1, 2006, to test and evaluate 
methodologies and arrangements between hospitals and physicians designed to govern the utilization of 
inpatient hospital resources and physician work to improve the quality and efficiency of care provided to 
Medicare beneficiaries and to develop improved operational and financial hospital performance with 
sharing of remuneration as specified in the project. Such projects shall be operational by not later than 
January 1, 2007. 
Deficit Reduction Act§ 5007(a). 
49 Deficit Reduction Act§ 5007(c)(l). 
!d. 
An incentive payment made by a hospital to a physician under and in accordance with a demonstration 
project shall not constitute- (A) remuneration for purposes of section 1128B of the Social Security Act 
(42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b); (B) a payment intended to induce a physician to reduce or limit services to a patient 
entitled to benefits under Medicare or a State plan approved under title XIX of such Act in violation of 
section 1128A of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1320a-7a); or (C) a financial relationship for purposes of section 
1877 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1395nn). 
50 DRA 5007 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration Solicitation, supra note 48 . The DRA required 
demonstration projects to meet the following criteria: 
( 1) Arrangement for remuneration as share of savings.-The demonstration project shall involve an 
arrangement between a hospital and a physician under which the hospital provides remuneration to the 
physician that represents solely a share of the savings incurred directly as a result of collaborative efforts 
between the hospital and the physician. (2) Written Plan Agreement.-The demonstration project shall be 
conducted pursuant to a written agreement that-(A) is submitted to the Secretary prior to implementation 
of the project; and (B) includes a plan outlining how the project will achieve improvements in quality and 
efficiency. (3) Patient Notification.-The demonstration project shall include a notification process to 
9 
to be budget neutral in order to ensure that gainsharing actually produced savings. 51 CMS established 
a protocol for evaluating budget neutrality. 52 The demonstration program was instituted in two 
locations: Beth Israel Medical Center in New York and Charleston Area Medical Center in West 
Virginia. 53 The outcome of these programs is discussed in Part II.C infra. 
B. Gainsharing models as applied to h_ealthcare 
Although gainsharing can be described generally as physicians suggesting and implementing 
cost-saving measures and the hospital sharing the savings with the physicians, as in the Scanlon plan, 
there are a number of different forms that such a program may take. One factor to consider is the 
method of determining compensation. For example, under the "Cost Management Contracts" model, 
physicians may be compensated for time spent participating in a committee to determine how to 
implement cost savings rather than based upon the amount of money saved. 54 If the incentive 
payments are tied to the amount saved, decisions must be made regarding how to distribute savings. 55 
Under other models, a hospital might distribute savings among those physicians within the practice 
area in which savings were recognized-the "Cost Per DRG" model-or those responsible for savings 
based on procedure type grouping-the "Cost Per Aggregate ICD-9."56 In another model, the 
inform patients who are treated in a hospital participating in the project of the participation of the hospital 
in such project. (4) Monitoring Quality and Efficiency of Care.-The demonstration project shall provide 
measures to ensure that the quality and efficiency of care provided to patients who are treated in a hospital 
participating in the demonstration project is continuously monitored to ensure that such quality and 
efficiency is maintained or improved. (5) Independent Review.-The demonstration project shall certify, 
prior to implementation, that the elements of the demonstration project are reviewed by an organization that 
is not affiliated with the hospital or the physician participating in the project. (6) Referral Limitations.-
The demonstration project shall not be structured in such a manner as to reward any physician participating 
in the project on the basis of the volume or value of referrals to the hospital by the physician. 
Deficit Reduction Act§ 5007(b)_ 
51 Medicare Gainsharing Demonstration_-Report to Congress on Quality Improvement and Savings, CMS Report to 
Congress, (Mar_ 28, 2011) at 12, 
https :/ /www .ems. gov/reports/ downloads/Buczko _Gain_ Sharing_F inal_ Report_ May _20 11. pdf. 
52 Id 
53 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration Fact Sheet, supra note 4L 
54 Gail P. Reagan & Ivan Wood, Gainsharing_· Aligning Incentives of Hospitals and Physicians, AHLA Seminar Materials 
P02109911 (1999)_ 
55 See id. 
56 Id 
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"Specialty Gainsharing" model, changes are implemented at the specialty level and the chair for the 
specialty determines how savings are distributed.57 Another program, "Line-item Gainsharing," 
involves the hospital or a manager identifying the most expensive items. 58 Physicians focus on 
reducing the cost and are directly paid a part of the savings. 59 
Other forms of gainsharing reduce or entirely elimiqate the payments to physicians. In 
"department management gainsharing," a manager or group of managers is hired to reduce costs in 
each department and is paid a "predetermined management fee."60 Saver has suggested a "three-way 
gainsharing" model in which a percentage of savings is retained by the hospital, a percentage is 
distributed to participating physicians, and the remainder is either distributed to patients as refunds or 
placed into a fund. 61 Patient representatives would manage the fund and use the money to directly 
improve patients' experiences in the hospital, such as subsidizing items that are not covered by 
Medicare and Medicaid for needy patients, adding patient libraries, providing internet access to 
patients, or upgrading family waiting rooms.62 The goal of such projects would be to convey to 
patients that the hospital and doctors are not benefitting from gainsharing at their expense and that 
patient welfare is a priority. 63 
C. Potential benefits and arguments for gainsharing as applied to healthcare industry 
Commentators have identified gainsharing as one method for reducing healthcare costs while 
preserving quality of care.64 Currently, Medicare and Medicaid compensate hospitals using a set per-
57 !d. 
58 !d. 
59 !d. 
60 !d. 
61 Saver, supra note 3, at 229. This is also very similar to the "reinvestment of cost savings" model described by Heagan 
and Wood, in which a portion of the savings is placed in a fund and physicians can suggest uses for it. Heagan & Wood, 
supra note 54. This model takes a similar form as Saver's model, but does not necessarily serve the same purpose. Jd. 
62 Saver, supra note 3, at 230. · 
63 !d. 
64 Saver, supra note 3, at 147. 
11 
patient fee based on a patient's diagnosis. 65 The fee does not depend on the amount or type of care 
that the patient requires. 66 On the other hand, physicians are compensated for each service 
performed. 67 This creates an incentive for hospitals to reduce costs as much as possible while doctors 
do not have such an incentive.68 Gainsharing aligns the hospital's incentives with the doctors' 
incentives so that there is a common goal of reducing costs while maintainipg quality of care.69 
Physicians are encouraged to help hospitals save money and are not as affected by the negative 
financial implications-and the potential compromise to patient care-associated with reducing the 
number of services. 70 
Saver argues that obtaining physician involvement is extremely important to reducing costs 
because "[n]early all the hot-button areas of hospital cost escalation ... drug costs, nursing costs, 
technology costs, etc.-can rise or fall depending upon the practice patterns of the hospital's staff 
physicians."71 This is similar to the advantage gained in the manufacturing industry, where those on 
the front lines are often those with the most insight into the best ways to reduce costs and increase 
productivity. This also calls into question the potential effectiveness of "department management 
gainsharing,"72 which eliminates physicians from the process. Gainsharing may be more likely to gain 
physician "buy-in" than other cost-saving measures because, rather than imposing changes on 
physicians, the hospital asks for their input and allows them to use clinical judgment. 73 
65 Marcoux, supra note 1, at 543-44. 
66 !d. 
67 !d. 
68 !d. 
69 Saver, supra note 3, at 154. 
70 !d. at 180. 
71 Jd. at 176. 
72 See supra Part II.B. 
73Saver, supra note 3, at 215 . 
12 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence in favor of gainsharing is the success of pilot programs. 
A gainsharing program was instituted at Pinnacle Health Systems in Pennsylvania in 2003.74 It 
reportedly saved $5.8 million during the three years that it ran, and attributed the savings largely to 
negotiating with vendors for better prices on medical supplies.75 
Results from the pilot program at Beth Israel Medical Center show that, since its demo b_egan 
in 2006, it has saved over $42 million and has distributed $8 million of the savings to participating 
physicians.76 Beth Israel reports that patient outcomes have not suffered since the project began.77 
Under the program, individual physicians, either an attending physician or a surgeon, were given 
financial responsibility for individual patients.78 Incentive payments were conditioned upon 
maintaining quality standards, including not having an increase in readmission rates, adverse events, 
or instances of malpractice; and meeting certain specialty-specific quality measures. 79 CMS reported 
on the outcome of the first year of the demonstration. 80 During the first year, Beth Israel distributed 
$585,000 of the savings among the 309 participating physicians.81 The savings were largely 
attributable to reduced length of stay in the hospital. 82 Although total cost of hospitalization 
decreased, costs in the ICU increased 32% during the pilot.83 It is unclear whether this increase was 
74 Joseph Mantone, Gain-sharing Seems to be Working, But Research Shows Stent Savings Come From Negotiations, Not 
Implementations, MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 5, 2006, at 33. 
75 !d. 
76 Phyllis Maguire, Results are in: Gainsharing Works, TODAY'S HOSPITALIST, Feb. 2011, available at 
http:/ /todayshospitalist.com/index.php?b=articles _read&cnt= 1168. 
77 Jd. 
78 Medicare Gainsharing Demonstration: Report to Congress on Quality Improvement and Savings, CMS Report to 
Congress, available at https://www.cms.gov/reports/downloads/Buczko_ Gain_Sharing_Final_Report_May_2011.pdf 
(Mar. 28, 2011) at 8. 
79 !d. 
80 !d. 
81 !d. at 1 o-. 
82 Michelle Grey Campion, Can Gainsharing Impact Cost Savings in the ICU? Hospital- Wide Analysis Hints at Impressive 
Rewards, ANESTHESIOLOGY NEWS (May 2011), available at 
http://www.anesthesiologynews.com/ViewArticle.aspx?d=Policy+%26+Management&d_id=3&i=May+20ll&i_id=729& 
a id=l7116 
83Id. 
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related to the program.84 Beth Israel reported that it plans to expand the program to the ICU in order 
to control these costs. 85 
Charleston Area Medical Center (CAMC) also established a gainsharing program under the 
demonstration program authorized by DRA Section 5007.86 The program focused on implementing 
cost-saving initiatives with cardiac diagnosis-related groups (DRGs).87 As expected, gainsharing 
incentive payments to individual physicians were contingent upon actual cost savings per episode of 
care and quality of care outcomes that did not show a statistically significant decline after the cost-
. . 1 d 88 saving measures were Imp emente . CAMC distributed about $165,000 of the savings among 
approximately 100 physicians during the first year of the demonstration program. 89 
Going forward, additional hospitals will begin to participate in gainsharing demonstration 
programs. 90 The acute care episode (ACE) demonstration project involves five hospitals within the 
Baptist Health System in San Antonio, Texas.91 The project began in 2009 and is planned to last for 
three years.92 Also, a group of twelve hospitals in New Jersey recently received CMS approval to 
begin a gainsharing demonstration program.93 Finally, the Greater New York Hospital Association 
84 !d. 
85 !d. 
86 Medicare Gainsharing Demonstration: Report to Congress on Quality Improvement and Savings, CMS Report to 
Congress, available at https://www.cms.gov/reports/downloads/Buczko _Gain_ Sharing_ Final_ Report _May_ 2011.pdf 
(Mar. 28, 2011). 
87 !d. 
88 !d. at 7. 
89 !d. at 11. 
90 Rebecca Vesely, An ACE in the Deck? Bundled-Payment Demo Shows Returns, MODERNHEALTHCARE Vol. 41, Issue 6, 
2011 WLNR 2726963 (Feb. 7, 2011); 12 NJ Hospitals Paying Doctors to Save Money, USA TODAY, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-08-19-hospital-costs_N.htm (Aug. 19, 2009 9:05pm) [add author, date before 
URL]. 
91 Vesely, supra note 90. 
92 !d. 
93 12 NJ Hospitals Paying Doctors to Save Money, supra note 90 New Jersey Hospital Association (NJHA) led the effort 
to obtain CMS approval for the demonstration program. Richard Pizzi, CMS Approves New Jersey Gainsharing 
Demonstration Project, HEALTH CARE FINANCE NEWS, (August 19, 2009) 
http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/cms-approves-new-jersey-gainsharing-demonstration-project. NJHA had 
previously received approval to conduct a gainsharing demonstration program in 2003. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp. 
Inc. v. Thompson, No. Civ.A.04-142(JWB), 2004 WL 3210732, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2004). 
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will begin a gainsharing program in which Medicare would "pay the hospitals and physicians at 
current rates" for the first six months of the program while the hospitals and doctors developed and 
instituted cost-saving rneasures.94 Thereafter, Medicare would receive a "discount."95 This program is 
part of the "CMS Bundled Payment for Care Improvement Initiative. "96 
Even outside of healthcare settings, gainsharing programs may not be successful or long 
lasting, as Dong-One Kim found. 97 It largely will be left to the hospitals to ensure the success of their 
gainsharing programs, but previous demonstration projects have indicated that gainsharing programs 
can succeed in the healthcare setting. 
D. Policy Concerns and Efficacy Barriers 
A frequent argument against gainsharing programs is that they create a perverse incentive for 
doctors to use lower quality products or to withhold medically necessary services in order to save 
money.98 There are a number of protections to prevent this from occurring. First, gainsharing 
demonstration programs require physicians to meet benchmarks in terms of clinical outcomes, thus 
eliminating the potential for perverse incentives. 99 Physicians also have other incentives to avoid a 
reduction in quality of care, such as concern for patient well-being, concern for professional 
The U.S. District Court for the District ofNew Jersey deemed the program to be a violation of the CMP Statute because 
the hospitals had not received OIG approval.Jd. at *12. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
94 GNYHA Eyes "Gainsharing" Plan for NY Hospitals, CRAINS NEW YORK, May 10, 2011, 
http:/ /www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20 11051 0/PULSE/11 0509878. 
95 Jd. 
96 CMS Unveils Bundled Payment Models, GNYHA.ORG (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.gnyha.org/7652/Default.aspx. 
97 Kim, supra note 23, at 34-36. 
98 One policy paper reports negative consequences of requiring physicians to use particular devices as follows: "In Iowa, 
doctors constrained by a hospital's agreement have reported having to transfer patients 
to other hospitals in order to get them the brand of medical device that they need. In 
Pennsylvania, a physician has sued his hospital for using a standardization contract as a facade for 
receiving illegal kickbacks from a major manufacturer." MED. DEVICE MFGS. ASS'N, CONGRESS SHOULD PROHIBIT 
DEVICE CONTRACT GAINSHARING TO PROTECT PERSONALIZED PATIENT CARE AND MEDICAL DEVICE INNOVATION, 
available at http://www .medicaldevices.org/ systernlfiles/Hill.LeaveBehind.F inal_ 000 _ 0. pdf? download= 1. 
99 See, e.g., Sachin H. Jain & Daniel Roble, Gainsharing in Healthcare: Meeting the Quality-ofCare Challenge, 
HEALTHCAREFINANCIALMANAGEMENT, March 2008, at 78 (discussing quality measurements as a safeguard); DRA 5007 
Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration Solicitation, CMS.GOV, available at 
https://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/DRA5007 _Solicitation. pdf. 
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reputation, and fear of malpractice litigation. These incentives would likely outweigh the incentive for 
additional financial remuneration for a large number of physicians. Finally, those programs currently 
approved as demonstrations require long-term measurement of cost-savings.100 Doctors will recognize 
that reducing quality of care for short-term savings will lead to increased overall cost in the long-term 
as patients will likely require extended hospital stays, treatment for complications, or readmissions to 
the hospital. 101 
Opponents of gainsharing also argue that seeking to reduce services directly violates doctors' 
"fiduciary and ethical duties to their patients."102 This concern is the basis for the OIG's interpretation 
of the Stark and CMP laws. 103 Clinical evidence has shown that in certain instances, reducing 
treatment or substituting a lower cost alternative can be associated with improved clinical outcomes.104 
For example, the goal of disease-management programs is to treat patients more effectively but with 
fewer episodes of care. 105 Because of this objective, disease-management initiatives may technically 
violate the Stark and CMP laws. 106 
Potential downsides to gainsharing may be avoided by adopting some of the OIG's 
requirements. For example, the OIG has suggested that there is an incentive for "cherry-picking"-
keeping healthy patients while referring unhealthy patients, who are more expensive to treat, to other 
institutions. 107 The OIG requires documentation of the types of patients seen by the hospital to ensure 
that hospitals and doctors do not tum away sick patients in order to save money. 108 
100 Medicare Gainsharing Demonstration: Report to Congress on Quality Improvement and Savings, CMS Report to 
Congress, available at https://www.cms.gov/reports/downloads/Buczko_ Gain_Sharing_Final_Report_May_2011.pdf 
(Mar. 28, 2011); Medicare Health Care Quality Demonstration Programs Fact Sheet, supra note41. 
101 Saver, supra note 3, at 207. 
102 !d. at 199. 
103 !d. 
104 !d. at 202-03. 
105 !d. at 212-13 . 
106 !d. 
107 Thorton, supra note 30. 
108 Hayman, supra note 37. 
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The type of risks associated with a gainsharing program will depend upon the type of 
gainsharing initiatives that a healthcare provider adopts. For example, the favorable advisory opinion 
that the OIG issued in 2001 involved gainsharing initiatives in a cardiology department. 109 One of the 
measures adopted by the cardiology department involved not opening surgical supplies prior to a 
patient's surgery so that the instruments would not be wasted if the surgeon did not need them. 110 
Such a measure does not encourage physicians to withhold care or otherwise change the way that 
patients are treated. Similarly, cutting costs through purchasing items in bulk would not encourage 
physicians to "cherry-pick" patients or otherwise negatively impact the way that patients are treated. 
An additional concern is that gainsharing initiatives would limit the treatment options available 
to physicians, thus limiting their freedom to make clinical decisions and negatively impacting quality 
of care through a de facto forced standardization. 111 In fact, this result would be in direct 
contravention to the purpose of the CMP Statute. Saver argues that imposing strict limitations on 
gainsharing can have the same effect: "[p ]hysicians often have to respond flexibly and with some 
degree of innovation and experimentation as to choosing different treatment paths, depending upon the 
particular needs and clinical circumstances of the individual patients."112 
Additionally, gainsharing creates the concern that excessive standardization of medical devices 
will allow manufacturers to increase market share and reduce competition, eventually enabling them to 
increase prices. There has been opposition, especially from device manufacturers, who argue that 
standardization will stifle innovation by destroying the market for new products. 113 A 
counterargument is that, at least when each contract is expired, hospitals and physicians will 
109 Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01-01,2001 WL 36190940 (HHSOIG Jan. 11, 2001). 
110 !d. 
Ill Jd. 
112 Saver, supra note 3, at 206. 
113 Paula DeJohn, Growing Popularity ofGainsharing Brings Pushbackfrom Manufacturers, 41 HOSPITAL MATERIALS 
MANAGEMENT 8 (2006); Gainsharing: Still the Wrong Answer, BlOMET.COM (June 9, 2010 7:07AM) 
http://www.biomet.com/corporate/ceoBlog/postDetail.cfm?postiD=58; Med. Device Mfgs. Ass'n, supra note 98. 
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continually look for ways to save costs, and perhaps will be more aggressive tn re-negotiating 
contracts as a result. 114 Also, if the programs are limited to individual departments within hospitals, 
each implementing its own cost-savings measures, standardization would be limited and negative 
effects on competition would be less likely. 
The risk that gainsharing programs will limit physicians' freedom or stifle innovation depends 
upon the size of the gainsharing programs and the level of freedom that physicians retain when 
deciding which products to use for individual patients. If the programs are limited to individual 
departments within hospitals, each implementing its own cost-saving measures, standardization would 
be limited. If, however, cost-saving measures were implemented on a broader basis, standardization, 
and possible detrimental effects on innovation, would be possible. 
Ill. LEGAL BARRIERS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GAINSHARING PROGRAMS IN HEALTH CARE 
SETTINGS 
A number of legal barriers, including regulations of tax-exempt entities, the Anti-Kickback 
law, the Stark Law, and the CMP Statute, have curtailed the establishment of gainsharing programs in 
healthcare. In recent years, this has been compounded by the OIG's inconsistent decisions about 
whether it will be enforce these laws against hospital gainsharing programs. 115 
A. Violations related to hospitals' tax-exempt status 
114 One might argue that gainsharing presents the same risk of consolidations and reversed incentives that has occurred in 
the context of Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs). Mariah Blake, Dirty Medicine, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, 
July/Aug. 2010, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2010/1007.blake.html. GPOs are organizations 
formed to purchase medical supplies in bulk at a discounted rate. !d. In 1986, CPOs were granted an exemption from the 
anti-kickback statute, which made it lawful for suppliers to pay GPOs "fees," which were essentially a portion of their 
revenue. "This created an incentive to cater to the sellers rather than to the buyers." !d.; see also S. Prakash Sethi, Group 
Purchasing Organizations: An Undisclosed Scandal in the US. Healthcare Industry (2009); Frank Pasquale, 
Understanding Medicine's Middlemen, BALKINIZATION (July 12, 2010), 
http:/ /balkin.blogspot.com/20 10/07 /understanding-medicines-middlemen.html 
115 Barry F. Rosen, Commentary: Clearer Guidance on Gainsharing Would Lower Costs, THE DAILY RECORD, July 7, 
2009. 
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Tax-exempt organizations may not use their earnings to benefit any "person with a personal 
and private interest in the activities of the organization" including doctors. 116 Tax-exempt 
organizations also may not serve any private interest unless the private interest is incidental to serving 
the public interest. 117 In order to be incidental to serving the public interest, the private interest "must 
be both qualitatively and quantitatively incidenta1."118 "Qualitatively incidental" means that the 
interest is a "necessary concomitant of the activity that benefits the public at large and the benefit 
cannot be achieved without necessarily benefiting certain private individuals."119 "Quantitatively 
incidental" means that the interest is "neither direct nor substantial in comparison to the benefit 
conferred on the public by the activity."120 The penalty to a physician or other individual deemed a 
"disqualified person" for violating this law is 25% of the excess benefit and, "if the excess benefit is 
not corrected, an additional tax equal to 200% of the excess benefit."121 
It is unclear whether gainsharing payments to physicians would qualify as "qualitatively 
incidental." Cost-saving initiatives could be instituted without providing the financial benefits of 
gainsharing to doctors, which means that the benefit to the public-reduced healthcare costs-could 
be achieved without benefitting private individuals. This could be accomplished under the 
"reinvestment of cost savings" model, or a variation on the "three-way costs savings model," both 
discussed in Part II.B supra. If the doctors' shares of the savings were reinvested in patient projects, 
the private benefit would be avoided. Importantly, however, gainsharing programs may be less 
successful if physicians do not have financial incentives to cut costs. 
116 Treas. Reg.§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2); Reagan & Wood, supra note 54. 
117 Reagan & Wood, supra note 54. 
118 ld. 
119 ld.; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978); Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 128; I.R.S. Gen. Couns. 
Mem. 39,498 (Jan. 28, 1986). 
120 Reagan & Wood, supra note 54; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978). 
121 Reagan & Wood, supra note 54. 
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According to some commentators, other forms of gainsharing can be modeled to comply with 
the regulations. 122 . In order to avoid penalties, gainsharing programs must pay doctors a reasonable 
compensation, taking into account the benefit conferred and the "fair market value" of the doctors' 
services. 123 The doctors' compensation must be "the result of arm's length bargaining ... [and] must 
not be merely a d~vice to distribute profits to insiders."124 The payments must also be "based on 
personally performed services, and tied to quality and efficiency measures monitored by an 
independent expert. 125 A safe harbor also exists, 126 but it contains a number of requirements related to 
the governance ofthe hospital, and so it is unlikely to protect gainsharing programs. 127 Finally, a 
program may also be deemed to be in compliance with the law if a "facts and circumstances test" is 
satisfied-that is, if the program is in compliance "based on all of the facts and circumstances."128 
B. Anti-Kickback laws 
The federal Anti-Kickback Statute imposes criminal penalties and potential fines on "whoever 
knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or 
rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind ... in return for referring an 
individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for 
which payment may be made in whole or in part under a federal health care program."129 Gainsharing 
programs can violate this statute because physicians may be incentivized to refer patients to the 
122 See id. 
123 !d. 
124 !d. 
125 Anne B. Claiborne et al., Legal Impediments to Implementing Value-Based Purchasing in Healthcare, 35 AM. J. L. & 
MED. 442, 489 (2009). 
126 Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-1 C.B. 632 (1997); Claiborne et al., supra note 125, at 489. 
127 In order to satisfy for this safe harbor, a hospital would have to ensure that: "(a) Not more than 20 percent of the voting 
power of the governing body of the qualified user in the aggregate is vested in the service provider and its directors, 
officers, shareholders, and employees; (b) Overlapping board members do not include the chief executive officers of the 
service provider or its governing body or the qualified user or its governing body; and (c) The qualified user and the 
service provider under -the contract are not related parties, as defined in§ 1.150-1(b)." Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-1 C.B. 632 
(1997). Although a hospital may fall under these exceptions, it would be unlikely that a hospital would re-organize its 
governance in order to satisfy the safe harbor. 
128 Claibourne et al., supra note 125, at 489 (citing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200926005 (Mar. 17, 2009)). 
129 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b; see also Reagan & Wood, supra note 54. 
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hospital, including Medicare and Medicaid patients whose care will be paid for "under a Federal 
health care program."130 This incentive may be present because increasing the volume of patients 
would increase the overall savings included in the gainsharing program. 131 
As of 2009, there were no safe harbors that protected gainsharing programs from liability for 
violating anti-kickback statutes, but_ hospitals could seek an advisory opinion from the 010. 132 The 
statute does contain a safe harbor for "personal service agreements and management contracts," which 
states that the term "remuneration," as defined by the statute, does not include payments made to an 
agent for the agent's services, pursuant to an agency agreement. 133 But the regulation's requirements 
would preclude many gainsharing agreements. For example, the "aggregate compensation paid to the 
agent over the term of the agreement [must be] set in advance. "134 Many gainsharing models 
determine the amount of compensation after the cost-savings initiatives have been instituted based on 
the amount of money saved. 135 Although the amount could be set in advance based on a different 
metric-e.g., the number of hours dedicated to meeting and developing ideas-or upon the projected 
amount of savings, this could diminish the level of incentive to follow through with the cost-saving 
130 Saver, supra note 3, at 171 n.100. 
131 !d. 
132 Claiborne et al., supra note 125, at 489. Since 2001, the OIG has issued 13 advisory opinions regarding gainsharing 
programs, finding that each program would or could potentially violate the CMP Statute and Anti-Kickback statute but 
stating that the OIG would not impose sanctions. Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 09-06, 2009 WL 2371264 (HHSOIG 
June 23, 2009), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 08-15,2008 WL 6067525 (HHSOIG Oct. 6, 2008), 1; Re: OIG 
Advisory Opinion No. 08-09, 2008 WL 6067519 (HHSOIG Jul. 31, 2008), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 07-21, 2007 
WL 6400848 (HHSOIG Dec. 28, 2007), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 07-22, 2007 WL 6400849 (HHSOIG Dec. 28, 
2007), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 06-22,2006 WL 6252293 (HHSOIG Nov. 9, 2006), 1; Re: OIG Advisory 
Opinion No. 05-06, 2005 WL 6289869 (HHSOIG Feb. 18, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-05, 2005 WL 
6289868 (HHSOIG Feb. 18, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-04,2005 WL 6289867 (HHSOIG Feb. 10, 2005), 
1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-03,2005 WL 6289866 (HHSOIG Feb. 10, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 
05-02,2005 WL 6289865 (HHSOIG Feb. 10, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-01, 2005 WL 6289864 
(HHSOIG Jan. 28, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01-01, 2001 WL 36190940 (HHSOIG Jan. 11, 2001), 1. 
133 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d); see also Reagan & Wood, supra note 54. 
134 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d). 
135 See Part II.B supra. 
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initiative. Thus, it is unlikely that any of the safe harbors sufficiently protect gainsharing programs 
from violating the Anti-Kickback Statute. 136 
C. StarkLaw 
The federal Stark Law prohibits physicians · with a financial relationship with a particular 
"entity" from referring patients to the entity for servi9es that would otherwise be paid using Medicaid 
or Medicare funds. 137 It also prohibits "entities" :from making claims for payment under such 
circumstances.138 The statute defines "financial relationship" to include: "a compensation 
arrangement ... between the physician ... and the entity."139 There is an exception for employment 
relationships in which the physician is compensated for "identifiable services."140 It also includes an 
exemption for "personal services" under a written agreement. 141 There also is a "physician incentive 
plan exception," but payment cannot be made as "an inducement to reduce or limit medically 
. ,142 
necessary services. 
136 Additionally, there are some state statutes that are similar to the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, and therefore hospitals 
must be cognizant of the risk of violating state law as well as federal law when instituting a gainsharing program. Heagan 
& Wood, supra note 54; see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-20-4 (West) (2007); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 44-113-60 (1994); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 456.054 (West) (2006). This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
137 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(l) (2006). 
138 !d. Entity is defined as "[a] physician's sole practice or a practice of multiple physicians or any other person, sole 
proprietorship, public or private agency or trust, corporation, partnership, limited liability company, foundation, nonprofit 
corporation, or unincorporated association that furnishes DHS [designated health services]. An entity does not include the 
referring physician himself or herself, but does include his or her medical practice." 42 C.F.R. § 411.351. Designated 
health services includes: 
!d. 
(i)Clinicallaboratory services. (ii) Physical therapy, occupational therapy, and outpatient speech-language 
pathology services. (iii) Radiology and certain other imaging services. (iv) Radiation therapy services and 
supplies. (v) Durable medical equipment and supplies. (vi) Parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment, and 
supplies. (vii) Prosthetics, orthotics, and prosthetic devices and supplies. (viii) Home health services. (ix) 
Outpatient prescription drugs. (x) Inpatient and outpatient hospital services. 
139 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
140 !d. § 1395nn(e). 
141 Heagan & Wood, supra note 54. 
142 !d. The term "medically necessary" is not defined in either the Statute or the OIG's decisions, but Medicare defines 
"medically necessary services" as: "Services or supplies that are needed for the diagnosis or treatment of [a patient's] 
medical condition and meet accepted standards of medical practice." Home Health Agency and Home Care Glossary of 
Definitions, MEDICARE.GOV, (last visited Apr. 24, 
2012).http://www.medicare.gov/homehealthcompare/(S(vfj5vd55qyihdqbiikpxu4rd))/Resources/Glossary.aspx?Choice=M 
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An exception was proposed in 2008 that would have allowed hospitals to institute gainsharing 
programs for up to three years, provided the programs met certain conditions. 143 The finalization of 
the rule, however, was delayed and the American Hospital Association, Federation of American 
Hospitals, and the Association of American Medical Colleges recommended changes to the rule 
because it contained too many restrictions to "allow for innovation and the types of physician-hospital 
efforts that maximize quality of health care."144 This rule has not been instituted to date. 
This may add to hospitals' hesitation in establishing gainsharing programs. Currently hospitals 
may run gainsharing programs that the OIG has approved via advisory opinions. 145 The OIG only 
issues opinions as to the Anti-Kickback and CMP statutes, 146 but it has generally not enforced the 
Stark Law against gainsharing programs that have received such approvals. 147 But should it 
promulgate an exception, programs already in existence could find themselves in violation of the 
exception if the programs do not meet the requirements. 148 
D. Civil Monetary Penalties Statute 
Under the CMP Statute, hospitals may not directly or indirectly compensate doctors for 
"reduc[ing] or limit[ing] services provided" to Medicare or Medicaid patients. 149 The statute provides 
for a fine of up to $2000 per patient for both the doctor and the hospital. 150 The CMP Statute was 
passed after Congress created the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS), which reimbursed 
hospitals for treating Medicare patients on a per-patient basis, rather than on a fee-for-service basis. 151 
When payment is made on a "per-patient basis," a hospital is paid a set amount of money for each 
143 Claiboume et al., supra note 125, at 487-88. 
144 !d. (citing Hospital Industry Groups Urge CMS To Ease Use ofGainsharing Deals, Revisit Proposal, HEALTH CARE 
FRAUD REP. (BNA) No. 13 (Feb. 25, 2009). 
145 Claiboume et al., supra note 125, at 488 . 
146 Rosen, supra note 115. 
147 Claiboume et al., supra note 125, at 488. 
148 !d. 
149 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a; Saver, supra note 3, at 155. 
150 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a; see also Beagan & Wood, supra note 54. 
151 Marcoux, supra note 1, at 543-45. 
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patient treated, based on the patient's diagnosis and regardless of the amount or type of care 
provided. 152 In contrast, payment on a "fee-for-service basis" means that a physician is compensated 
for each treatment given to the patient so that treatment costs for a particular condition will vary from 
patient to patient and from doctor to doctor. 153 At the same time, Medicare continued to reimburse 
doctors on a fee-for-service basis. 154 Therefore, there was concern that hospitals wquld attempt to 
reduce the costs associated with patient care by paying doctors to reduce the services rendered. 155 
The CMP Statute does not define the terms "reduce or limit" or "services," and, in a Special 
Advisory Bulletin, the OIG adopted a broad interpretation of the statute, as applied to "any physician 
incentive plan that conditions hospital payments to physicians or physician groups on savings 
attributable to reduction in hospital costs for treatment."156 The OIG does not assume that the services 
must be medically necessary in order for the statute to apply: "In our view, this interpretation is plainly 
wrong. Simply put, the language of the statute refers to 'services,' not 'medically necessary services,' 
and requires a showing of intent to induce a reduction of services, not an actual reduction."157 
Claibourne has recommended that Congress amend the statute to include the words "medically 
necessary services," thus making it acceptable for hospitals to compensate physicians for reducing 
services that are not medically necessary as part of gainsharing programs. 158 
By contrast, managed care organizations (MCOs) are not allowed to pay doctors to "reduce or 
limit medically necessary services to Medicare and Medicaid patients."159 Thus, MCOs are limited in 
their ability to enact gainsharing programs, but not to the same degree that hospitals are limited. 160 
152 !d. at 543. 
153 !d. 
154 !d. 
155 !d. at 543-44. 
156 Claiboume et al., supra note 125, at 486-87. 
157 Recent Commentary Distorts HHS OIG's Gainsharing Bulletin, 1999 WL 34984741 (HHSOIG), 1. 
158 Claiboume et al., supra note 125, at 491. 
159 Heagan & Wood, supra note 54 (emphasis added). 
160 Saver, supra note 3, at 162. 
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The OIG has concluded that the difference in wording signifies Congress's desire to provide MCOs 
with some discretion so that they could save costs, while preventing hospitals from denying any 
services to Medicare and Medicaid patients. 161 
IV. GAINSHARING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
The PPACA contains several provisions that, although they do not address the laws discussed 
above, do aim to promote gainsharing programs. Notably, § 3022 of the PP ACA creates the 
"Medicare Shared Savings Program," which would require accountable care organizations (ACOs) to 
"have a formal legal structure that would allow the organization to receive and distribute payments for 
shared savings."162 Accountable care organizations are "groups of doctors, hospitals, and other health 
care providers, who come together voluntarily to give coordinated high quality care to the Medicare 
patients they serve."163 The Medicare Shared Savings Program enables Medicare to "share a 
percentage of the achieved savings with the ACO" provided the ACO "meet[s] both the quality 
performance standards and generate[s] shareable savings."164 This program, however, does not 
include doctors and hospitals that are not part of an ACO. 
The PPACA also provides additional funding for the gainsharing demonstration and extends 
the program, which was set to expire in 2010, through 2014 or until the funds are exhausted. 165 
Although this was certainly a step to encourage further demonstration programs, the trouble is that it 
requires a very long time to collect data, and the amount of data collected is smal1. 166 Also, the 
161 !d. 
162 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b )(2)(C) (2006). 
163 Accountable Care Organizations Overview, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/ACO/. 
164 Medicare Program, Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 42 C.F.R. § 425 (2011). 
165 42 U.S.C. § 18001. 
166 MedPAC Chair: CMS Has Authority to Expand Pilots but Lacks Money, 13 INSIDE CMS 14 (July 8, 2010). 
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demonstration programs' requirement for budget neutrality may be too strict, which disallows cost-
saving initiatives with high up-front costs mitigated by long-term savings. 167 
The PP ACA does not specifically remove the legal barriers discussed above. It also does not 
address the concerns raised with regard to Tres. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-l(c), under which a gainsharing 
program could be found to have net earnings "inure to the benefit of private shareholders or 
individuals," jeopardizing the hospital's tax-exempt status. With regard to the Anti-Kickback Statute, 
the PPACA § 6402 amends 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6)(F) to provide that the term "remuneration" 
under the statute does not include ''any other remuneration which promotes access to care and poses a 
low risk of harm to patients and Federal health care programs (as defined in section 1128B(f) and 
designated by the Secretary under regulations)." This is unlikely to apply to remuneration for 
gainsharing programs, however, because such programs do not directly "promote access to care." The 
PP ACA also does not include any amendments to the Stark Law that would create an exception to the 
law for gainsharing programs. 168 With regard to the CMP Statute, the PPACA includes amendments 
related to correction of reporting errors and to the procedures involved in collecting civil monetary 
penalties; the amendments do not address gainsharing. 169 
The PPACA does give CMS the authority to waive the CMP Statute and the Anti-Kickback 
restrictions and immunizes these waivers from judicial and administrative review, according to the 
chair of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, in order to expand the demonstration 
program. 170 This is helpful because hospitals seeking to participate in demonstration programs will no 
longer be required to obtain separate approval from the OIG. This provision is inadequate, however, 
167 Stuart Guterman & Michelle P. Serber, Enhancing Value in Medicare: Demonstrations and Other Initiatives to Improve 
the Program 23 (The Commonwealth Fund/Alliance for Health Reform Jan. 2007). 
168 The only amendments are related to exemptions for referrals for certain imaging and scans and "other designated health 
services ... that the Secretary deems appropriate," and mandating the establishment of procedures for reporting violations 
of the law. 42 U.S.C. § 18001 Sec. 6003 (2006); !d. § 18001 Sec. 6409. 
169 42 U.S.C. § 18001 Sec. 6111 (2010). 
170 MedPAC Chair: CMS Has Authority to Expand Pilots but Lacks Money, supra note 166. 
26 
because it does not address the potential for gainsharing programs to violate the Stark Law or the tax 
regulations and only applies to hospitals participating in demonstration programs. 
It is unlikely that Congress will pennanently amend statutes until the pilot programs prove to 
be effective, but the pilot programs thus far have been too small to provide sufficient data. 171 
Although the additional authority given to CMS may encourage participation in the gainsharing 
demonstrations, 172 providing statutory safe harbors or making appropriate amendments to the 
applicable laws would enable gainsharing on a more widespread basis. 173 
It has been argued that there are insufficient funds to promote gainsharing demonstrations. 174 
This creates a "catch-22" whereby gainsharing is only permitted on a limited basis until pilot data is 
available, but limiting the allowable gainsharing programs limits the amount of available pilot data. 
Enacting statutory changes will make hospitals more willing to invest in gainsharing programs.175 
Some have argued that hospitals' hesitation to establish gainsharing programs is due to a lack of 
funding in general. 176 The argument may be that hospitals do not have enough incentive to incur the 
costs to start up such programs because they are not guaranteed a benefit. This argument, however, 
disregards the fact that the nature of gainsharing makes the largest costs, the payment to the doctors, 
contingent upon savings to the hospital. Removing legal barriers will reduce the risks associated with 
establishing a gainsharing program and will make hospitals more willing to invest financial resources. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
171 !d. 
172 PPACA "establishes at least 35 pilot programs and demonstrations," that test different methods of payment and forms 
ofhealthcare delivery. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH CARE REFORM SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 176 (Thomson Reuters 
2011); see also Atul Gawande, Testing, Testing, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 2009, available at, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/12/14/091214fa_fact_gawande (arguing that employing trial and error via pilot 
programs is an important way to "curb costs and increase quality). 
173 MedPAC Chair: CMS Has Authority to Expand Pilots but Lacks Money, supra note 166. 
174 !d. 
175 See discussion infra Part IV for recommended statutory changes. 
176 Gainsharing Gets Boost; Projects Still Lack Funding, MODERNPHYSICIAN.COM, June 9, 2008, available at 
http://www.modemphysician.com/article/20080609/MODERNPHYSICIAN/363294579. 
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Advisory opinions have been insufficient in promoting gainsharing because entities may be 
penalized if the law changes in a way that subsequently renders an advisory opinion letter void. Also, 
if entities establish gainsharing programs and then the law changes, conforming to changes in the law 
could be costly and could eliminate any savings recognized by instituting the program. There must be 
a sense of security that the law will not change in this manner, or that if the law changes there will be 
exemptions for programs that have already been established. 
A. Tax-exempt Organizations 
The treasury department should provide a safe harbor to the requirement in Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.50l(c)(3)-l(c)(2). 177 An argument against this action is that it could invite fraud. Hospitals might 
create purported gainsharing programs that do not institute any cost-saving or quality-improving 
measures, but simply serve to distribute profits illegally. Although fraud is a concern, the safe harbor 
provision could contain many of the same requirements that the proposed Stark Law exception and the 
177IRS Notice 2011-20, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-20.pdf. Similar concerns have been raised with regard to tax-
exempt ACOs participatirig in the Medicare Shared Savings Program. See supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text. 
The IRS issued a notice stating that soliciting comments regarding whether it has provided sufficient guidance as to how to 
avoid violating restrictions on private inurement. IRS Notice Regarding Participation in the MSSP through an ACO, 2011 
WL 1219269 (Apr. 18, 2011). The notice states that: 
I d. 
[T]he IRS expects that it will not consider a tax-exempt organization's participation in the MSSP through 
an ACO to result in inurement or impermissible private benefit to the private party ACO participants 
where: 
· The terms of the tax-exempt organization's participation iri the MSSP through the ACO (including its 
share ofMSSP payments or losses and expenses) are set forth in advance in a written agreement negotiated 
at arm's length. 
· CMS has accepted the ACO irlto, and has not terminated the ACO from, the MSSP. 
· The tax-exempt organization's share of economic benefits derived from the ACO (including its share of 
MSSP payments) is proportional to the benefits or contributions the tax-exempt organization provides to 
the ACO. If the tax-exempt organization receives an Owriership irlterest iri the ACO, the ownership interest 
received is proportional and equal in value to its capital contributions to the ACO and all ACO returns of 
capital, allocations and distributions are made iri proportion to owriership interests. 
· The tax-exempt organization's share of the ACO's losses (including its share ofMSSP losses) does not 
exceed the share of ACO economic benefits to which the tax-exempt organization is entitled. 
· All contracts and transactions entered into by the tax-exempt organization with the ACO and the ACO's 
participants, and by the ACO with the ACO's participants and any other parties, are at fair market value. 
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demonstration programs contained. 178 For example, the Treasury Department could require hospitals 
to maintain documentation of the measures implemented, the baseline measures of performance, and 
ongoing measurements of quality of care and cost savings. Upon an audit, the hospital would be 
required to produce this documentation. Adding such a requirement to the safe harbor would not add 
any additional costs to the hospitals because they would already be required to take these steps in 
order to qualify for other safe harbor provisions. 
B. Anti-Kickback Statute 
The Anti-Kickback Statute should be amended to include a safe harbor for gainsharing 
programs. As discussed above in the context of treasury regulations, the safe harbor could include 
several requirements to ensure that only bona fide programs qualify for the safe harbor. 179 
Additionally, these requirements would not burden hospitals with any costs that they would not 
otherwise have to bear. 180 As with providing a safe harbor under Treas. Reg. § 1.50l(c)(3)-l(c)(2), 
providing a safe harbor for gainsharing programs under the Anti-Kickback Statute could invite fraud. 
The safe harbor provision could contain requirements like those in the proposed Stark Law exception 
and the demonstration programs to deter fraud. 181 
C. StarkLaw 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid proposed an exception to the Stark Law in 2008. The 
exception would have applied to payments made to physicians participating in: 
certain documented incentive payments or shared savings programs designed to 
achieve (1) improvement of the quality of hospital patient care services by 
changing physician clinical or administrative practices, and/or (2) actual costs 
savings for the hospital resulting from the reduction of waste or changes in a 
178 See supra note 159 and accompanying text for a discussion of similar requirements in the context of the Anti-Kickback 
Statute. 
179 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
180 See supra Part V.A. 
181 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
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physician's clinical or administrative practices, without an adverse effect on or 
diminution in the quality of hospital patient care services. 182 
This exception would only apply to incentive programs that met certain criteria. 183 Programs would be 
required to identify cost-saving or quality-improvement measures and to track the success of these 
tneasures. 184 Hospitals would then set goals for performance measures and identify baseline levels. 185 
Under the proposed exception, programs would be required to include at least five physicians and to 
give all physicians within the applicable specialty the opportunity to participate without regard to the 
physician's patient volume or level of "business generated for the hospital." The hospital would be 
prohibited from limiting the products available to doctors or preventing them from adopting new 
technologies that are "linked to improved outcomes."186 The exception also required the hospital to 
disclose to patients that it had established a gainsharing program and would have required hospitals to 
. . d f h . 187 matntatn recor s o t e cost -savtng measures. 
The exception was not enacted because of a number of concerns, in particular that it was too 
restrictive to permit innovation. 188 In an advocacy letter to CMS, the American Hospital Association, 
Association of American Medical Colleges, and the Federation of American Hospitals stated that "[b ]y 
regulating not only the 'what' but the 'how' of an incentive payment or shared-savings program, CMS 
limits hospitals' ability to incorporate the health care community's evolving understanding of what 
contributes to patient quality and safety."189 Also, the exception only applied to programs that did not 
182 Wilson Hayman, Is Gainsharing Finally Here to Stay? Recent Advisory Opinions and Proposed Stark Exception 
Appear to Pave the Way, THENATIONALLAWREVIEW, (Aug. 26, 2009) available at 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/gainsharing-finally-here-to-stay-recent-advisory-opinions-and-propo. 
183 !d. 
184 Jd. 
185 Jd. 
186 Id. 
187 Jd. 
188 Claiborne et al., supra note 125, at 488. 
189 Letter from Rick Pollack, Executive Vice President of the American Hospital Ass'n, Joanne Conroy, Chief Health Care 
Officer of the Ass'n of American Medical Colleges & Charles N. Kahn III, President of the Federation of American 
Hospitals, to Charlene Frizzera, Acting Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Feb. 17, 2009), 
available at http:/ /www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2009/090217 -cl-CMS-1403-FC.pdf. 
30 
violate other federal statutes-notably, gainsharing programs are also likely to violate the Anti-
Kickback and CMP statutes. 190 
The proposed exception takes into account a number of the concerns that have been expressed 
about gainsharing and therefore should be used as a model in enacting a new exception. Specifically, 
the requirement that hospitals set goals and identify baseline measures and track performance will help 
ensure that physicians feel they are compensated fairly, thus increasing "buy-in" and motivation to 
participate. 191 Prohibitions against limiting the products available and the use of new technologies 
protect the physicians from being excessively controlled and allow them to exercise clinical judgment. 
They also simultaneously protect individual patients from being denied specialized care. The 
requirement that hospitals disclose the establishment of the gainsharing program to patients maintains 
transparency and will help prevent patients from thinking they are being shortchanged. 192 According 
to the OIG's 2005 opinions, hospitals must disclose the gainsharing program to patients in writing, 
preferably before patients are admitted, but otherwise prior to surgery. 193 
The proposed exception, however, demands that hospitals identify the cost-saving or quality 
improvement measures up front. 194 As Saver noted, part of the gainsharing process is to solicit 
suggestions for cost-saving measures. 195 By requiring hospitals to identify the cost-saving measures 
up-front, the law may indirectly require them to solicit suggestions from physicians before there is any 
190 See Part II.D (ii) and (iv) supra for discussion of the legal barriers posed by the Anti-Kickback and CMP laws. 
191 See Part II.C supra, stating that gainsharing programs in general may be more likely than other cost-saving measures to 
encourage physician "buy-in." 
192 According to one longitudinal study, there was no statistically significant difference between overall patient satisfaction 
before and after the institution of a gainsharing program. Charles Foster & Lynn Godkin, "Gainsharing" and Patient 
Satisfaction, HEALTH PROGRESS, July/ Aug. 2000, at 4 7-48, available at 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=l&source=web&cd=5&ved=OCEAQFjAE&url=http%3A%2F 
%2Fwww.chausa.org%2Fworkarea%2FDownloadAsset.aspx%3Fid%3D2147483964&ei=dZe1Tt3LEKjg2AXLxNDMDQ 
&usg=AFQjCNHd3-0yr_wuVAQSV7-1QljW8PF _eg&sig2=W4mdptcp5rpEmMjrX6TpRA. The article, however, states 
that all non-management employees were included in the program and does not describe the nature of the cost-saving 
measures taken. !d. at 43. 
193 Barry F. Rosen & Jacy D' Aiutolo, Commentary: Doctors May Share in Hospitals' Cost Cuts, Sometimes, THE DAILY 
RECORD, Sept. 9, 2005. 
194 Hayman, supra note 182. 
195 Saver, supra note 3, at 170--71. 
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guarantee that the suggestions can legally be implemented. Although this may not seem prohibitive, it 
would involve using physician's time to discuss the suggestions and the likelihood of success of cost-
savtng measures. Depending on the type of measures suggested, involvement of administrative 
personnel and other staff members may be required to assess the feasibility of the suggestions. This 
amounts to an investment_ on the part of the hospital without any guarantee that the measures could 
legally be implemented. To avoid this problem, the exception could include a grace period during 
which the hospital and physicians, having already committed to a gainsharing arrangement, could 
identify cost-saving measures and establish the necessary benchmarks. 
Saver and others have proposed an alternative interpretation for the restriction against paying 
doctors to "limit or reduce services" for Medicare and Medicaid patients. 196 The OIG has interpreted 
these statutes to apply to any services, whether or not the services are medically necessary. 197 
Medicare's reimbursement rules, however, state that Medicare will only reimburse for services that are 
"reasonable and necessary."198 Therefore, one could argue that the words "medically necessary" are 
inherently implied in the Stark Law and CMP Statute. 199 A reversal of opinion by the OIG, however, 
might not provide hospitals with the sense of security needed to incentivize them to institute 
gainsharing programs. There could be an ongoing concern that the OIG will revisit the decision and 
return to its former interpretation. 
D. CMP Statute 
As discussed above, under the CMP Statute, penalties may be imposed on hospitals that pay 
physicians to reduce or limit services for Medicare and Medicaid patients and on physicians who 
196 !d. at 165 n.71. 
197 Claibourne et al., supra note 125, at 486--87. 
198 Saver, supra note 3, at 165 n.71. The term "reasonable and necessary" has not been defmed by statute; its meaning has 
been debated. Timothy P. Blanchard, Medical Necessity" Determinations-A Continuing Healthcare Policy Problem, 37 
J. HEALTH L. 599, 604 (2004). Blanchard suggests that the term "reasonable" and "necessary'' may take cost into account 
as well as the patient's health: "What 'necessary' services are 'reasonable' for taxpayers or members of an insurance risk 
pool to shoulder?" Id. 
199 Id. 
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accept such payments.200 The OIG has interpreted this statute to include all services, even those that 
d. 11 201 are not me tea y necessary. Saver suggested that the OIG's interpretation of the statute was 
incorrect, and, that the statute, by its nature, would only apply to situations in which a physician 
limited or reduced services that were medically necessary?02 Although this is a compelling argument, 
a change in the OIG's interpretation may nqt be sufficient. Without an actual change to the statute, the 
OIG may reverse the decision and re-adopt the current interpretation. In order to encourage hospitals 
to establish gainsharing programs, more certainty is needed. 
Claibourne has proposed that the CMP Statute's application to gainsharing programs could be 
resolved by amending the statute to include the words "medically necessary" so that the statute 
prohibits paying doctors to "reduce or limit medically necessary services."203 It is likely that this 
would resolve the problem, especially considering the importance that the OIG has placed upon the 
words "medically necessary" in previous decisions.204 
E. The Hospital Fair Competition Act of 2005 
In 2005, Senator Charles Grassley and twenty-three co-sponsors introduced a bill in the Senate 
that would have explicitly made gainsharing programs legal.205 S.l 002, titled the Hospital Fair 
Competition Act of 2005, would have created exemptions to the CMP Statute, the federal Anti-
Kickback Statute, and the Stark Law for "arrangements between hospitals or critical access hospitals 
and physicians in which physicians share in the savings experienced by the hospital or critical access 
hospital by reason of cost-reduction efforts that involve the physicians."206 The bill also authorized 
the Secretary of Department of HHS to establish requirements for the programs to ensure that the 
200 42 U.S.C § 1320a-7a (2006). 
201 Claiboume et al., supra note 125, at 486--87. 
202 Saver, supra note 3, at 164--65. 
203 !d. at 491. 
204 !d. at 491. 
205 S.1002, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005); see Appendix A for§ 4 of the Hospital Fair Competition Act of2005. 
206 !d. 
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shared-savings arrangements did not pose a risk to patient care and that "financial incentives that 
could affect physician referrals [would be] minimized. "207 The bill expired at the end of the session?08 
The record as to the bill is very limited, but it is possible that the Hospital Fair Competition Act did 
not progress in the Senate due to concerns about a provision that would have extended the Stark Law's 
prohibition on physician-owned hospitals and changes to the way that hospitals would be paid?09 
F. Outlier laws 
Saver suggested minimal regulation via outlier laws, which would "identify only the most 
problematic practices, leaving other forms of gainsharing unregulated."210 Other problematic forms of 
gainsharing that were troublesome but not the most problematic would be discouraged by "publicity, 
market pressures, physicians' professional ethics, and tort deterrence," rather than regulation.211 Such 
a law may encourage hospitals to adopt gainsharing programs and experiment with cost-saving 
measures. Enacting such a law, however, would still leave hospitals with a great deal of uncertainty as 
to whether they risk violating the CMP, the Anti-Kickback Statute, or the Stark laws, and whether they 
risk losing their tax -exempt status. The outlier laws could provide an exemption for gainsharing 
programs. In order to prevent fraud, the law would then have to define what qualifies as a gainsharing 
program. This could mean restricting the freedom of hospitals, which is what adopting the outlier 
laws would strive to avoid. An outlier law would be a promising possibility if it included minimal 
standards for what programs would qualify for exemptions of the problematic laws. 
As discussed above, the PP ACA does not adequately remove the legal barriers to the 
establishment of gainsharing programs. Currently, there is a circuit split as to the constitutionality of 
207 !d. 
208 !d. 
209 See, e.g., Proposed Self-Referral Ban Casts Chill on Specialty Hospitals, MWE.COM (May 18, 2005), 
http://www .mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetaill object_id/ e671 Oc2c-4070-4d 1 O-b5f4-cea8c7 a 7 4d0d.cfm; 
Congress Holds Gainsharing Hearing, GNYHA.ORG, http://www.gnyha.org/902/Default.aspx?&print=yes (opposing 
changes to hospital payment methods but supporting the ban on physician-owned hospitals). 
210 Saver, supra note 3, at 227-28. 
211 !d. at 228. 
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some prov1s1ons of the PP ACA?12 There is a question as to the severability of the "individual 
mandate" provision, which has been challenged?13 If the provision is deemed not severable, the 
PPACA provisions discussed above would also be invalid.214 Whether the PPACA is constitutional is 
beyond the scope of this Comment, but should Congress repeal the bill or should the Supreme Court 
deem it unconstitutional, future efforts to reform healthcare should seek to Cl:dopt these measures, in 
order to afford hospitals the opportunity to institute cost-saving initiatives. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
If given the appropriate regulatory environment, gainsharing programs have the potential to 
reduce healthcare costs and increase efficiency without sacrificing the quality of healthcare. A 
number of legal barriers have prevented such programs from taking hold because hospitals and other 
medical entities do not want to risk facing penalties. Efforts to encourage, or at least accommodate, 
gainsharing programs have thus far been accomplished in a piecemeal manner, through pilot programs 
and advisory opinions. 
Although Congress enacted a large number of changes to health care via the PP ACA, it did not 
resolve the legal barriers to gainsharing in this legislation in a permanent way. Although the OIG may 
continue to issue favorable advisory opinions, healthcare organizations will only be able to establish 
productive and permanent gainsharing programs if Congress makes permanent amendments to the 
relevant statutes. 
212 Compare Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) aff'd~ 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039 
(6th Cir. June 29, 2011) with Florida ex rei. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th 
Cir. 2011). 
213 Florida ex. rei. Atty. Gen., 648 F.3d at 1241. 
214 See id. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE HOSPITAL FAIR COMPETITION ACT OF 2005 
SEC. 4. PERMISSIBLE COORDINATED CARE INCENTIVE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN HOSPITALS AND 
PHYSICIANS 
(a) Establishment ofRequirements for Arrangements and Exemption From Imposition of Civil 
Monetary Penalties- Section 1128A of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1320a-7a) is 
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: 
o. Arrangements Between Hospitals and Physicians-
(1) IN GENERAL- Subsection (b) shall not apply to an arrangement that meet the 
requirements under paragraph (2). 
(2) REQUIREMENTS-
(A) ESTABLISHMENT- The Secretary shall establish requirements for 
arrangements between hospitals or critical access hospitals and 
physicians in which physicians share in the savings experienced by the 
hospital or critical access hospital by reason of cost-reduction efforts 
that involve the physicians. 
(B) PROTECTIONS- In establishing the requirements under subparagraph 
(A), the Secretary shall ensure that-
(i) the quality of care provided to individuals is protected under the 
arrangement; and 
(ii) financial incentives that could affect physician referrals are 
minimized. 
(C) MONITOR- The Secretary shall establish procedures to monitor 
arrangements described in subparagraph (A) to ensure that such 
agreements meet the requirements under such subparagraph. 
36 
(b) Exemption From Criminal Penalties- Section 1128B(b)(3) of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b)(3)) is amended-
(1) in subparagraph (G), by striking 'and' at the end; 
(2) in subparagraph (H), as added by section 237(d) of the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of2003 (Public Law 108-173; 117 Stat. 2213)--
(A) by moving such subparagraph 2 ems to the left; and 
(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; 
(3) by redesignating subparagraph (H), as added by section 431(a) of the Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-
173; 117 Stat. 2287), as subparagraph (I); 
(4) in subparagraph (I), as so redesignated-
(A) by moving such subparagraph 2 ems to the left; and 
(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting '; and'; and 
( 5) by adding at the end of the following new subparagraph: 
(J) an arrangement that meets the requirements established under section 
1128A(o). 
(b) Exemption From Limitation on Certain Physician Referrals- Section 1877( e) of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395nn(e)) is amended by adding at the end of the following new 
paragraph: 
(9) ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN HOSPITALS AND PHYSICIANS- An arrangement 
that meets the requirements established under section 1128A(o). 
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